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Abstract
In this paper, we outline the three main concepts of ‘ageism’; health maximisation ageism, productivity ageism, and
fair innings ageism. We provide a methodological overview of the existing empirical literature on people’s preferences
regarding age and classify these studies according to the types of questions that have been asked. We consider some of
the methodological issues involved in eliciting preferences regarding ageism and propose using a ﬁxed duration of
beneﬁt rather than, as some studies have done, a beneﬁt that lasts for a full lifetime. Informed by this discussion, we
present the results from our own empirical study, carried out in the UK, which combines qualitative and quantitative
methods to explore the reasons people have for choosing one age over another. In so doing, we are able to consider the
extent to which respondents might bring extraneous factors to bear on their responses and/or disregard relevant
information (such as that relating to the ﬁxed nature of the beneﬁt). The results suggest that people are broadly in
favour of giving priority to younger over older people, based on arguments relating to both productivity ageism and fair
innings ageism. However, respondents appear to assume that a beneﬁt would last for a full lifetime (even if they are told
to assume a ﬁxed beneﬁt), unless they are asked to consider a ‘full-life’ beneﬁt ﬁrst. This particular framing effect has
important implications for preference elicitation studies, suggesting that if you want people to answer the question you
have in mind, ﬁrst ask them the question you think they may have in mind.
Introduction
Deciding the principles upon which health care should
be distributed has become a crucial policy issue for most
publicly funded health care systems. There are many
possible characteristics of the recipients of health care
(including their age, sex, and degree of responsibility for
their illness) that could be taken into account when
setting priorities. A number of empirical studies have
been undertaken to determine the extent to which
members of the general public wish to take account of
such characteristics when setting priorities (Olsen,
Dolan, Richardson, & Menzel, 2001). One of the most
hotly debated characteristics, and the focus of this
paper, is the age of the patient (Evans, 1997; Williams,
1997a).
In this paper, we provide a methodological review of
the existing empirical literature on people’s preferences
regarding ageism.1 We classify these studies according to
the types of questions that have been asked and then
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1 In lay language, this term may suggest unacceptable
discrimination on the basis of age, but, in this paper, the term
is neutral with regard to the legal, ethical and political
appropriateness of differential treatment by age.
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consider some of the issues that are involved in trying to
provide quantitative information about people’s prefer-
ences concerning age. In particular, we note that there is
a lack of any qualitative element in the studies and, as
such, we do not really know what respondents were
thinking about when their preferences were elicited.
Informed by the review, we present the results from our
own empirical study, which was designed to uncover
people’s reasoning behind their preferences over age.
Concepts of ageism
According to Tsuchiya (1999), there are three main
types of ageism. In this paper, the ﬁrst type of ageism
will be referred to as ‘‘health maximisation ageism’’
(HMA).2 This is compatible with the assumption that
each unit of health—expressed, for example, in terms of
quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs)—is of equal value,
irrespective of who receives those QALYs. Fig. 1a
depicts the case where the relative value given to a year
of life at different ages is constant. Since all ages are
given equal weights, the relative value is at 1.0. There-
fore, ceteris paribus, HMA will give priority to a
younger person over an older one since the former will
usually experience any health gains for longer. The
central concept in HMA, then, is not age per se; rather it
is life expectancy, which will depend heavily (but not
exclusively) on current age.
The second type of ageism is ‘‘productivity ageism’’
(PA). This gives priority to young adults because they
are more productive—in a wide sense rather than in a
narrow market-oriented way—at home and in society. A
given health gain at different ages will then be valued
differently according to the expected level of productiv-
ity at each age. The value given to a year of life at
different ages will typically start at a relatively low value,
increase rapidly to young adulthood, and then decrease
more slowly towards old age (see Fig. 1b). The age
weights used in the calculation of the Burden of Disease
follow this pattern (Murray, 1996).3
The third type of ageism will be referred to as ‘‘fair
innings ageism’’ (FIA).4 This looks at people’s lifetime
health, which could be quantiﬁed as the number of
QALYs people can expect to have over their lifetime. In
its extreme form, FIA will set some discontinuous
threshold or cut-off corresponding to the fair innings,
beyond which people will be denied health care. In its
less extreme form, the fair innings represents the point at
which people will be given a relative weight of one in the
priority-setting calculus. If an individual has poorer
(better) lifetime health prospects than the fair innings,
they will be given relative weights larger (smaller) than
one. This form of FIA will give priority to a younger
person over an older one because, ceteris paribus, the
former has a smaller number of expected lifetime
QALYs than the latter (Williams, 1997b). FIA will
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Fig. 1. (a) Health maximisation ageism; (b) productivity
ageism; (c) fair innings ageism.
2This has sometimes been referred to as ‘utilitarian ageism’
(Nord, Richardson, Stret, Kuhse, & Singer, 1996) but this
would imply the maximisation of utility rather than health.
3This age weighting function starts at zero, reaches a peak at
age 25 with a relative weight of 1.5, and then falls but never
reaches a relative weight of 0.0. These weights have no meaning
in any absolute sense but simply reﬂect the relative weight at
one age as compared to another.
4Nord et al. (1996) refer to a similar concept, and call it
‘egalitarian ageism’. However, this is rather imprecise since
there are many types of egalitarianism, and it is not clear from
this name what should be equalised across people.
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also give higher relative value to a person from a
disadvantaged background than to a person from a
more advantaged background, because, ceteris paribus,
the former has less expected lifetime QALYs than the
latter. Fig. 1c illustrates two cases: line X is for those
who have a lower expected number of lifetime QALYs
than the fair innings when they are young (so that they
are given a relative weight greater than one up until the
point at which they are expected to achieve the fair
innings); and line Y is for those whose odds of achieving
the fair innings is always greater than one.
Studies of ageism
There have been several attempts to study people’s
preferences about age weighting in health (for a review
of some of these, see Tsuchiya, 1999). The usual
approach involves asking respondents which of two
patients or groups of different ages should be given
priority over the other when it is not possible to treat
both at once. Table 1 classiﬁes these studies according to
the types of questions that have been asked. Some
studies appear in more than one cell because they have
used more than one kind of question. Whether and how
the studies have tried to quantify the extent to which one
patient or group is preferred over the other is shown in
the columns of the table. Some studies have elicited only
ordinal preferences, whilst those that have attempted to
quantify preferences have done so in three ways—by
varying the number of people of treated, by changing the
size of the health beneﬁts that each patient or group can
expect, or by varying both simultaneously.
The rows of Table 1 represent the different ways in
which health beneﬁts have been expressed. There are
two elements for consideration. The ﬁrst is whether
health beneﬁts are presented as life saving or as
improvements in health. If the basic assumption of the
QALY concept holds, a given health gain will have the
same social value regardless of how that health gain is
comprised, so it will not matter whether preferences over
different ages have been quantiﬁed through trade-offs in
terms of length or quality of life. However, to our
knowledge, no study has presented beneﬁts in terms of
life saving and health improvement, so it is unclear
whether this basic assumption of the QALY holds in this
context. The second element for consideration is
whether beneﬁts are presented as lasting for the rest of
the recipients’ lives or for a shorter ﬁxed period. If the
objective of quantifying ageist preferences is to design
age weights for use in cost-per-QALY studies, then it
will be more helpful to generate a set of weights
reﬂecting the relative values of a single year of life at
different ages, rather than the relative values of various
durations starting at different ages.
Fig. 2 shows the ages used in those studies that have
attempted to quantify preferences. While some studies
cover a wide age range, starting from early childhood to
advanced age, other studies only cover middle age
onwards. When the implied relative values of a healthy
year at different ages are compared, there are no studies
where respondents as a whole supported indifference
across the ages, and in all studies the relative value is
observed to decline after middle age.5 Therefore, in
terms of the concepts of ageism, the results from these
studies do not support simple HMA but instead provide
some support for PA and FIA, depending on whether
the relative value function increases before decreasing or
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Table 1
Classiﬁcation of empirical studies of preferences regarding ageism
Quantiﬁcation the beneﬁt Unquantiﬁed Quantiﬁed in terms of
number of people
Quantiﬁed in terms of the
beneﬁt
Life saving, for remaining
life
Charny, Lewis, and Farrow
(1989)
Cropper, Aydede, and
Portney (1994)
Nord, Richardson, Street,
Kuhse, and Singer (1995)
Johannesson and Johansson
(1997)
Nord et al. (1996)
Life saving, for ﬁxed period This study Nord et al. (1996) Rodr!ıguez and Pinto (2000)
Ratcliffe (2000) Ratcliffe (2000)
Health improvement, for
remaining life
Nord et al. (1995)
Health improvement, for
ﬁxed period
Nord et al. (1996) Busschbach, Hessings, and
de Charro (1993)
Tsuchiya (2001)
5These results have been found to be largely independent of
the respondent’s own age and other background characteristics.
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whether it decreases monotonically with age. It is
difﬁcult to distinguish between PA and FIA from the
studies to date since few have looked at the relative
values given to younger people and, amongst those that
have, the evidence seems mixed.
An additional difﬁculty is that, even when the study is
designed to elicit PA-related preferences by controlling
for FIA, it is unclear to what extent respondents have
been able to separate out the two concepts of ageism
when generating their responses (see Tsuchiya, 2001).
This is a consequence of the wider issue that very few
studies have asked respondents for the reasons behind
their responses (but see Tsuchiya (2001) for some
discussion of this). Both qualitative and quantitative
methods are required to gain a comprehensive under-
standing of the complexity of people’s preferences about
age weighting, and so our empirical study was designed
to discriminate between the different concepts of ageism
and to explore the reasons people have for choosing one
age over another. Moreover, there is now plenty of
evidence to suggest that people’s preferences are
inﬂuenced by a range of framing effects (for a review,
see Rabin, 1998) and so, by looking at the reasons for
people’s responses, we might shed some light on what
factor(s) inﬂuenced those responses. In particular, it has
been shown that people sometimes edit out of informa-
tion common to all alternatives (Payne & Bettman,
1992), which, in this study, might result in them
disregarding the size of the beneﬁt afforded to each
age group.
Overall study design
In order to distinguish between efﬁciency or produc-
tivity reasons (i.e. younger people getting more out of
given health beneﬁts) and equity or fair innings reasons
(i.e. younger people having smaller expected lifetime
health), the main set of interviews were preceded by
preliminary interviews (using a different group of
respondents) that gathered qualitative data on the
reasons behind people’s preferences. Further, the main
set of interviews were carried out in two rounds (with
two different groups of respondents). This allowed
lessons learnt from round one to be fed into the design
of round two. Respondents in all phases of the study
were presented with ﬁve ages—5-year olds, 20-year olds,
35-year olds, 55-year olds and 70-year olds—chosen to
represent ﬁve different stages in the life cycle. The main
task was to rank order these age groups.
Methodological issues
Table 1 suggests that there are a number of
considerations when deciding upon which question
format to use. For the purposes of this study, which
aims to discriminate between different concepts of
ageism rather than to quantify those preferences, we
can simply ask people to choose between two groups of
equal numbers of people differing initially only in age
(i.e. the ﬁrst column in Table 1). Now consider the rows
in Table 1. There are difﬁculties with expressing beneﬁts
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Fig. 2. The ages used in the empirical studies. The ages used in each empirical study are indicated along the horizontal axes. The bold
part indicates the range of the ages used. The circle indicates the observed age where relative value peaked. z Peak age depended on
respondent age group: older respondents chose 35 as peak. y Peak age depended on question format: see text for details.
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over the remaining lifetime (i.e. the ﬁrst and third rows).
The weights for individual years of life at different ages
will be a function of the life expectancy of the recipients
as perceived by the respondent and the rate at which the
respondent discounts health beneﬁts. Since neither of
these can be observed directly, it makes more sense to
use a ﬁxed and shorter duration of beneﬁt; that is, to use
the question formats in the second and fourth rows of
Table 1. We chose 5 years as the ﬁxed duration of
beneﬁt, which should be long enough to be considered as
a meaningful beneﬁt by most respondents. The use of a
ﬁxed duration also means that, in principle, we can
control for HMA since this would imply indifference
between the ages.
Things can perhaps be narrowed down further, since
there is a complication in eliciting preferences in terms of
health improvements. The standard assumption in the
literature on QALYs is that the decrement in quality of
life due to a given health problem is independent of the
person’s age. However, we suspect that many respon-
dents would be more likely to think that a given health
problem (having problems walking about, say) would
represent a larger loss to a younger person than to an
older one, and so the loss in quality of life will vary—in
the respondent’s mind—according to the age of the
person experiencing that loss. In order to mitigate this
possible confounding factor, we decided to represent
beneﬁt in terms of years of life in full health.
The samples
Every eighth person on the electoral register in three
wards in York, England, was contacted and invited to
participate. Out of a total of 1500 letters of invitation,
467 people (31%) agreed to take part. To ensure that the
achieved sample of the survey was broadly representa-
tive of the wider population, 140 respondents were
chosen, based on information on a broad range of
characteristics obtained from their reply slips. Ten
preliminary interviews were carried out, followed by 60
in round one and 70 in round two. All interviews were
carried out by one of the authors and two other
researchers. Table 2 shows the characteristics of the
samples in rounds one and two. Those included in the
study have background characteristics similar to the
Yorkshire and Humberside population, although smo-
kers are under-represented. Whether or not the respon-
dent has dependant children is the only item where the
two samples are statistically signiﬁcantly different from
one another (p ¼ 0:02; w2 test).
Analysis
The results of the ranking exercise from the two
rounds of interviews are presented in terms of the
proportion of respondents who give a particular rank to
each age, and aggregate rankings are summarised as
Borda scores.6 (To adjust for different numbers of
respondents in the two rounds, the aggregated rank is
divided by n.) To compare the pattern of ranking for a
particular age, two tests were employed. One is the w2
test for trend (or for linear-by-linear association), which
compares the distribution of ranks given to a particular
age across rounds. Since the rank given to a particular
age is not independent of the ranks given to the other
ages, the test is only applied to those ages where the
modal preference for that age is to rank it ﬁrst. The
other test is a Mann–Whitney U test of the ranks given
by individuals to a particular age across rounds. In
addition, w2 tests for independence were used to test for
any association between the ranking and the reasons for
them, and for the effect of respondent background
characteristics on the rankings and reasons for them. All
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Table 2
Respondent characteristics
Category Round 1 Round 2 Yorks and
Humberside
Sex
Male (%) 48 49 47
Female (%) 52 51 53
Age
o44 years (%) 48 51 49
>45 years (%) 52 49 51
Mean age 50 48
Dependantsa
Children (%) 57 76 66
No-children (%) 43 24 34
Smoking status
Smoker (%) 15 17 27
Non-smoker
(%)
85 88 73
Economic status
Employed (%) 60 49 56
Other (%) 40 51 44
N 60 70 4014
aCharacteristic with different distribution between the two
rounds (po0:05; w2 test).
6Borda scores are calculated by treating the ordinal
information as if they were expressed on an interval scale.
For each respondent, the ﬁrst through ﬁfth ranked ages are
given scores of 5 through 1. These scores are then added up
across the respondents for each age, so that the age with the
largest total score is ranked ﬁrst and the age with the lowest
score is ranked last.
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differences reported are at the 5% level of signiﬁcance
unless otherwise stated.
The empirical study
The preliminary interviews
The preliminary interviews were tape-recorded and
transcribed. Respondents were ﬁrst presented with the
ﬁve ages and told that the people in each of these groups
would die in a few days. They were then asked to rank
the ages in the order in which they would treat them,
assuming that they would each receive a ﬁxed beneﬁt of
5 years. Respondents were asked to give reasons for each
of their rankings. Through a template-based identiﬁca-
tion of codes and themes (Crabtree & Miller, 1992), a
small number of categories were identiﬁed. These
categories were:
(1) Lived less life / had a ‘fair innings’—a typical
quote: ‘‘The 5-year old has lived less life and deserves a
chance’’.
(2) Beneﬁt to society—‘‘The 35-year old could give a
lot to society if given an extra 5 years—financially and to
his family’’.
(3) Family and/or other responsibilities—‘‘The 35-
year old might have children and an extra 5 years would be
very valuable, as the child would have a parent for that
extra bit of time’’.
(4) Five years may be more valuable to some people
than others—‘‘The 35-year old would have 5 more years
in which to look after their child whereas the 5-year old
wouldn’t really understand what they were getting’’.
Notice that the ﬁrst reason is related to FIA, whilst all
other reasons concern PA. The results from these
interviews suggested that people are quite capable of
dealing with issues of life saving at different ages.
The first round of interviews
Design
Given the above, in the ﬁrst round of interviews,
respondents were asked exactly the same question; that
is, to rank the ages on the basis of a 5-year beneﬁt,
assuming that people of each age would die in a few days
without treatment. The respondent was asked to explain
the reason of their choice, and their replies were coded
by the interviewer using categories (1)–(4) above. Most
respondents only gave one reason, but if more than one
reason were given, the interviewer asked which was the
main one for coding. In order to accommodate any
responses that might not ﬁt with these reasons, two
additional categories were included. These were:
(5) Capacity to beneﬁt (treat the younger because they
have a longer life expectancy).
(6) Other (any other response that the interviewer
recorded verbatim).
Category (5) was included in order to detect any
respondent who was mistakenly thinking in terms of
full-life beneﬁt. However, not using this category does
not necessarily guarantee that respondents were not
mistaken.
Results
Table 3 shows how the respondents in the ﬁrst round
of interviews ranked the ﬁve ages. The most common
response was to rank the ages in ascending order, from
5-year olds ﬁrst to 70-year olds last—45% of respon-
dents had this particular ranking and the Borda scores
decrease monotonically from age 5 to age 70. The
reasons for the rankings are shown in the ﬁrst column of
Table 6, where it can be seen that two-thirds of the
respondents give reasons that were coded ‘have lived less
life’. This reason was more likely to come from those
who ranked the ages in ascending order as compared to
those who had some other ordering (w2 test, po0:001).
In addition, those who have 35-year olds ranked ﬁrst
were more likely to give ‘family responsibilities, etc.’ as
the reason for their ranking (w2 test, po0:001). There
was little evidence that the rankings or the reasons for
them are related to particular respondent characteristics,
including age.
Tables 3 and 6 show quite clearly that the majority of
respondents in round one rank the ﬁve ages in ascending
order. Now, if preferences across the sample are such
that the intensity of the preferences of a minority with
35-year olds ranked ﬁrst was stronger than the intensity
of the preferences of the majority with 5-year olds
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Table 3
Ranking results in round one—5-year beneﬁt question
Age Rank 1(%) Rank 2(%) Rank 3(%) Rank 4(%) Rank5(%) Borda score
5 53 10 23 10 3 4.0
20 20 60 10 8 2 3.9
35 22 20 53 5 0 3.6
55 2 10 10 75 3 2.3
70 3 0 3 2 92 1.3
Modal rank is in bold.
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ranked ﬁrst, then a ‘hump-shaped’ age weighting
function might, on average, still be possible.7 But we
have no reason to suppose that this is the case and the
results suggest that there is general support for FIA over
PA amongst the sample. If this is the case, the results
contrast with those of other studies that have included
young ages, and which suggest a ‘hump-shaped’ age
weighting function rather than a monotonically decreas-
ing one. The results reported here imply that some
respondents might not have taken full account of the 5-
year beneﬁt and perhaps instead thought of the beneﬁt
lasting for a full lifetime, thus allowing their responses to
be contaminated by HMA.
The second round of interviews
Design
One way of testing for the possibility that differences
in normal life expectancy across the ages might be
confounding responses (even if it is not mentioned as the
reason given) is to ask respondents to ﬁrst rank the ﬁve
ages on the basis that they would live a normal life
expectancy if treated. Reasons for this ranking could
then be probed, and then the 5-year beneﬁt question
asked in the same way as in round one (followed by
further probing). The juxtaposition of the 5-year beneﬁt
question with a ‘full-life’ beneﬁt question should high-
light the ﬁxed and limited nature of the beneﬁt in the
main ranking question.
If the results from round one are genuine, and FIA
dominates, then the full-life beneﬁt question in round
two should not affect the rankings in the 5-year beneﬁt
question that follows it. Therefore, the results for the 5-
year beneﬁt question will be comparable across the two
rounds. If, on the other hand, the results from round one
are confounded by HMA, then the addition of the full-
life beneﬁt question in round two will serve to reduce
this artefact. Therefore, the results from the 5-year
beneﬁt questions will differ across the two rounds, with
the ages in round two less likely to be ranked in
ascending age order. The stronger the artefactual
explanation, the closer the results for the 5-year beneﬁt
question in round one will be to the results for the full-
life beneﬁt question in round two.
Results
Table 4 shows how the respondents in round two
ranked the ﬁve ages in the full-life beneﬁt question.
Here, the overwhelming majority of respondents rank
the ages in ascending order, with 76% ranking age 5
ﬁrst. The Borda scores decrease monotonically from age
5 to age 70 even faster than they do for the rankings
shown in Table 3. The reasons for the rankings are
shown in the second column of Table 6. It can be seen
that the three concepts of ageism are mentioned as the
main reason for the ranking by one-third of respondents
each.
Table 5 shows how these respondents then ranked the
ﬁve ages in the 5-year beneﬁt question. There are clear
differences between rounds one and two. Only 39% of
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Table 4
Ranking results in round two—full-life beneﬁt question
Age Rank 1(%) Rank 2(%) Rank 3(%) Rank 4(%) Rank 5(%) Borda score
5 76 13 10 1 0 4.6
20 13 76 10 1 0 4.0
35 10 7 80 1 1 3.2
55 0 3 0 96 1 2.0
70 1 1 0 0 97 1.1
Modal rank is in bold.
Table 5
Ranking results in round two—5-year beneﬁt question
Age Rank 1(%) Rank 2(%) Rank 3(%) Rank 4(%) Rank 5(%) Borda score
5 39 3 17 24 17 3.2
20 14 56 17 13 0 3.7
35 43 17 39 0 1 4.0
55 3 24 23 50 0 2.8
70 1 0 4 13 81 1.3
Modal rank is in bold.
7We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing this out.
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respondents ranked 5-year olds ﬁrst, compared with
53% in round one (two-sided z-test, p ¼ 0:092). The
modal rank for the 35-year olds changed and the
percentage of respondents who rank this age ﬁrst
doubled. Further, the percentage of those placing 5-
year olds at ranks 4 and 5 tripled, those placing 55-year
olds at rank 2 doubled, and those placing age 70 at rank
4 had a large increase. The Borda scores imply a hump-
shaped proﬁle with age 35 as the peak age.
An inspection of the Borda scores reported in Tables
3–5 suggests that the aggregated ranking of the 5-year
beneﬁt question in round one more closely resembles
the full-life beneﬁt question in round two, rather than
the same 5-year beneﬁt question in round two. It should
be noted, however, that the Borda scores for the 5-year
beneﬁt question in round two are not very stable and
a couple of respondents changing their minds could
make these closer to the scores for the 5-year beneﬁt
question in round one. Moreover, in terms of the
percentage of respondents who ranked the ages in
ascending order (45% in Table 3, 73% in Table 4, 33%
in Table 5), the 5-year beneﬁt question in round one lies
somewhere between the two questions asked in round
two.
To explore the extent to which the results of the 5-year
beneﬁt questions in the two rounds are similar to each
other, w2 tests for trend on the distribution of the
ranking was carried out on 5- and 35-year olds, and it
was found that the patterns differ across rounds
(p ¼ 0:02 for 5-year olds, p ¼ 0:013 for 35-year olds).
Further, the Mann–Whitney U tests for rank scores
indicates that while the scores for 20- and 70-year olds
do not differ across the rounds, the scores for the other
ages do: p ¼ 0:040 for 5-year olds; p ¼ 0:010 for 35-year
olds; and p ¼ 0:001 for 55-year olds. Thus, the results
presented in Table 3 are different from those in Table 5.
The same set of tests indicates that the results from the
5-year beneﬁt question in round one are different from
the results of the full-life beneﬁt question in round two.
The w2 test for 5-year olds has p ¼ 0:001; and, for 35-
year olds, p ¼ 0:013: Mann–Whitney U tests do not
suggest signiﬁcant differences in the rankings for 20- and
70-year olds between the two questions, but do indicate
signiﬁcant differences for the other ages (p ¼ 0:020 for 5-
year olds; p ¼ 0:010 for 35-year olds; p = 0.007 for 55-
year olds.
Given that the backgrounds of respondents of the two
rounds differed in terms of having children or not, there
is the possibility that the observed difference across
rounds may be due to different composition of
respondents. To address this, w2 tests for trend compar-
ing the ranks given to 5-year olds in the 5-year beneﬁt
question in the two rounds were carried out on
subgroups of respondents with or without children.
The difference between the rounds is signiﬁcant both
amongst those with children (p ¼ 0:03) and those
without (p ¼ 0:02). Thus, it is unlikely that the different
composition of respondents across the rounds has
caused the different ranking results.
On the other hand, by doing the same for other
background characteristics that are roughly comparable
across the rounds, those characteristics that are affected
more or less by the insertion of the full-life beneﬁt
question were picked up. The ranking for the 5-year olds
by those in employment, those in age groups 16–34, and
65+ is stable across the rounds, while this is not the case
with those not in employment (p ¼ 0:002) and those in
age group 35–64 (p ¼ 0:012).
The reasons for these rankings are shown in the third
column of Table 6, where it can be seen that there are
also striking differences between the rounds in the
reasons for the rankings—differences that have impor-
tant implications for the possible concepts of ageism
used. This time, unlike responses in round one that
favoured FIA, responses are much more evenly spread
across the response categories (so that support for PA
now totals 61%). Notice also that 21% of respondents
in round two cite ‘5 years is more valuable to some’ as
compared to nobody in round one. Respondents who
ranked the ages in ascending order are, as in round one,
more likely to give ‘have lived less life’ as their reason (w2
test, p ¼ 0:005).
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Table 6
Reasons for rankings (numbers are percentage of respondents)
Reason Round 1: 5-year beneﬁt Round 2: full-life beneﬁt Round 2: 5-year beneﬁt
1. Have lived less life (FIA) 67 33 37
2. Greater beneﬁt to society (PA) 8 23 17
3. Family responsibilities, etc. (PA) 22 10 23
4. Five years is more valuable to some (PA) 0 0 21
5. Capacity to beneﬁt (HMA) 0 33 0
6. Other 3 1 2
Reason (1) is consistent with fair innings ageism.
Reasons (2)–(4) are consistent with productivity ageism.
Reason (5) is consistent with health maximisation ageism.
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Discussion
There a number of ways in which preferences
regarding the three concepts of ageism—HMA, PA
and FIA—have been elicited, and this paper has
discussed the relative merits of some of them. Our
contention that it is better to present respondents with a
ﬁxed duration of beneﬁt (thus controlling for HMA)
across a broad range of ages that facilitates discrimina-
tion between FIA and PA. The results from round one
of our study suggest that FIA is the dominant concern,
with little support for PA. We found the extent of this
preference to be a little surprising and, despite the fact
that no respondent gave ‘capacity to beneﬁt’ as the
reason for their ranking, we suspected that some might
not have taken full account of the 5-year beneﬁt and
perhaps instead thought of the beneﬁt lasting for a full
lifetime.
The results from round two, which tested for the
possible confounding effects of HMA by preceding the
5-year beneﬁt question with a full-life beneﬁt question,
conﬁrm our suspicions. The overall ranking of the
ages in the 5-year beneﬁt question in round one is the
same as that of the ages in the full-life beneﬁt question in
round two but is signiﬁcantly different from the overall
ranking of the ages in the 5 year-beneﬁt question which
followed the full-life beneﬁt question in round two.
However, the results of the 5-year beneﬁt question are
also not close to the results of the full-life beneﬁt
question in round two. In other words, the responses
in round one stand somewhere in between the response
to the two questions in round two, and so the responses
to the 5-year beneﬁt question in round one would
seem to be partly (rather than fully) confounded by
HMA.
These results provide quite strong support for the idea
that a proportion of respondents in round one failed to
appreciate—or edited out—the ﬁxed nature of the
beneﬁt. As noted earlier, this is in keeping with the
psychological research that shows how respondents
when faced with complex choices will often adopt
simplifying strategies, including the editing out of
information common to all alternatives. This strategy
has been used to explain similar visual analogue values
for states lasting very different durations i.e. respon-
dents highlight the severity of each state but put on one
side the (common) length of time spent in each state (see
Robinson, Dolan, & Williams, 1997).
The idea that some respondents did not have the 5
year beneﬁt at the forefront of their minds is reinforced
by the reasons given for the rankings, where a ﬁfth of
respondents in round two gave ‘5 years is more valuable
to some’ as the reason for their ranking, as compared to
no-one giving this reason in round one. There seems to
be little doubt that the juxtaposing of the full-life beneﬁt
question with the 5-year beneﬁt question highlights the
limited nature of the beneﬁt in the latter question, and so
the important methodological message from the results
of round two is, if you want people to answer the
question you have in mind, ﬁrst ask them the question
you think they may have in mind.
There are, of course, limitations to this study. Apart
from those shortcomings that are common to studies
that ask members of the public hypothetical questions,
there are two main limitations here. Firstly, we did not
allow respondents to rank any of the ages equally, and
so some respondents might have been forced to make a
choice when they were truly indifferent between two or
more ages. On the other hand, people are used to
making clear choices and indifference is a concept used
mainly by economists. We are aware of one study that
compared the extent to which two groups of respondents
wished to give priority to severely ill people, when one
group was allowed to ‘give equal priority’ (Ubel, 1999).
The results suggest that the inclusion of this option had
a signiﬁcant effect on the distribution of responses.
Whether or not the inclusion of an indifference option
results in more ‘valid’ data is, as the authors themselves
suggest, open to debate.
Secondly, and perhaps of greater concern here, is the
fact the samples in rounds one and two differed slightly,
particularly in relation to whether or not respondents
had dependents (children). Therefore, some of the
differences between rounds might be attributable to
differences between the two groups of respondents.
However, statistical tests suggest otherwise.
A ﬁnal word of caution concerning the qualitative
data. Whilst qualitative information certainly helps us to
‘get behind the numbers’, it is only really effective when
respondents themselves are aware of the reasons for the
choices they make. It would seem from the results in this
study, where no respondent in round one gave ‘capacity
to beneﬁt’ as their reason, that qualitative data will not
detect a respondent’s own editing-out of relevant
information. However, by combining quantitative data
across two rounds of interviews with qualitative
analysis, this study has reached a better understanding
of the respondents’ ageist preferences.
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